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1 Introduction
A state or other jurisdiction which imposes high taxes on the rich may induce
some residents to move away. Such migration would appear to limit a state’s
ability to redistribute income or to finance generous social benefits. The prob-
lem may generate a “race to the bottom,” with each state attempting to attract
rich residents by taxing them at a lower rate than other states do; the equi-
librium may have no redistributive taxes. Despite this theoretical possibility,
we see governments engaged in large redistribution. Migration may be limited
for several reasons: moving is costly; some people prefer one location over an-
other; property values decline in response to higher taxes, thereby reducing the
incentives to move.
This paper examines the last two considerations. In particular, we suppose
that good locations are scarce in any jurisdiction: people who want to live
near the beach or on top of a mountain with a gorgeous view will find such
locations limited.1We shall see that a small income tax imposed on the rich in
a jurisdiction with heterogeneous locations reduces property values in desirable
locations, reduces the utility of each rich person, and increases the utility of
each poor person. Tax incidence, however, is complicated because a person’s
utility depends on three elements: his post-tax income, the rent he pays, and
the location where he lives. The incomes of rich people, after paying the tax
and after paying rents, fall, but by diﬀering amounts. Property values also
fall, hurting landlords. These results, which relate to the research tradition in
urban economics, thus extend the conventional public finance view on taxes and
migration.
We find that incorporating the insights of urban economics, namely that
taxes are partly capitalized in property values and rents, can change some con-
ventional results in the public finance literature. A key insight of the literature
on tax competition is that mobility of taxpayers reduces the scope for redistri-
bution, and that governments will choose to impose low taxes on persons who
may leave the country. This would imply that a utilitarian government which
aims to transfer income from the rich to the poor in the absence of migration
would engage in less redistribution if the rich can emigrate. We find instead
that migration can increase redistribution. We also find that even when taxa-
tion does not distort labor supply, a utilitarian government in a closed economy
does not fully equalize incomes; it may even engage in regressive redistribu-
tion. But if migration is possible, a utilitarian government will not engage in
regressive taxation.
2 Literature
Taxes and migration The eﬀect of taxes on migration is a central topic in
studies of international tax competition; see, for example, Wildasin (1994) and
1The scarcity of desirable locations may also make the property tax attractive. We focus,
however, on an income tax imposed on rich persons, with labor supply inelastic.
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Sinn (1997). Christiansen, Hagen and Sandmo (1994) show how diﬀerences in
average income tax rates aﬀect migration. Though migration is influenced by
relative employment and earnings opportunities, they are considered elsewhere,
and we do not.2We focus on income taxes levied on the rich. Wilson (2003)
presents an excellent summary and an extension of the results concerning prop-
erty values and land taxation.
Voting Several papers consider the tax rates that a majority of voters in a
jurisdiction will adopt; see Westhoﬀ (1977), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984),
Epple and Romer (1991), and Goodspeed (1989). The models assume that
households diﬀer along a single dimension, typically income. In these mod-
els, an appropriately defined marginal rate of substitution is assumed to vary
monotonically across household. Use of such a monotonicity condition on the
marginal rate of substitution was first introduced by Ellickson (1971). Under
this assumption, households will be perfectly stratified by income across juris-
dictions.
Epple and Platt (1998) model local jurisdictions in which households diﬀer in
both income and tastes, and can thus generate less stark income stratification.
Hindricks (1999) considers how redistribution aﬀects mobility, which in turn
determines the identity of the voters and the levels of redistribution they favor.
Taxes and property values The eﬀects of taxes on property values and on
migration are studied by Epple and Romer (1991). They argue that though
local redistribution induces sorting of the population, the induced changes in
property values make redistribution feasible. But whereas in Epple and Romer
(1991) land is homogeneous, in our model some locations are preferred to oth-
ers.3 We show that this leads to diﬀerent implications even when people have
identical preferences. Epple and Platt (1998) study redistribution in a system
of local jurisdictions when households diﬀer in their preferences and in their in-
comes. In most models, complete income stratification is a necessary condition
for equilibrium. In our model the equilibrium can have rich people live in all
communities.
Hansen and Kessler (2001) study the interaction of mobility and taxation,
but with a focus diﬀerent from ours. Their model explains why tax rates are
lower in small countries than in large ones. People have diﬀerent incomes and
migration arises from self-selection. In their model, the political equilibrium
has rich people voting for low taxes and low grants; poor people vote for high
taxes and high grants. Their key asymmetry is geographical size, which diﬀers
between the countries. The basic diﬀerence between our model and theirs lies
in the timing of decisions: they have budgetary policy determined after people
2See Bover, Muellbauer, and Murphy (1989) for labor market aspects, and Haavio and
Kauppi (2002) for the eﬀects of liquidity constraints. Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) consider
commuting as an alternative to migration.
3Epple and Romer’s model is, however more general than ours in their treatment of housing:
unlike them we suppose that the size of a house and of a lot is fixed.
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move; as in the public finance tradition, we have tax rates set by governments
before people move.
We shall analyze tax policy under two alternative assumptions of government
preferences. The first type is a Leviathan government which maximizes tax
revenue, while transferring a fixed fraction to the poor. The second type is a
utilitarian government which maximizes the sum of the utilities of all residents,
and does so by transferring income between the rich and the poor.
3 Assumptions
Residents Each resident is either rich or poor. All have the same utility
function. The pre-tax income of each rich person is yR; the pre-tax income
of each poor person is yP . Land diﬀers in its location and hence in its rent.
Location is indicated by e, the elevation at which a person resides. Elevation
ranges from 0 to H = 1 and is evenly distributed on [0, 1]. Each elevation can
accommodate a density of one resident. If all the land on the hill is occupied,
the population on the hill is unity. We can view quality diﬀerences in several
ways. For example, the jurisdiction could be viewed as having one hill, or else
one major city. In the hill interpretation, higher elevations have a better climate
or a better view. In the city interpretation, quality declines with distance from
the city.
An individual’s utility defined over consumption of goods (x) and elevation
(e) is
U = u(x) + v(e) = ln(x) + ln(e).
Initially, the jurisdiction has nR rich people; migration can change that number.
The number of poor residents is fixed at nP ; they cannot migrate. Assume that
both the rich and the poor live on the hill, and that nP +2nR ≤ 1. Land is thus
suﬃciently abundant to house all people in the post-migration equilibrium.
Government policy Government can impose only one tax, a lump-sum of τ
on each rich person. Below we shall make various assumptions about how the
revenue is redistributed. One assumption is that the government redistributes all
tax revenue from the rich to the poor. Another assumption is that government
is a Leviathan, keeping the tax revenue for its own purposes. We take a more
general view, allowing the government to keep a share α of the tax revenue for
itself, and redistributing the rest to the poor. Let the number of rich people
in jurisdiction i in the equilibrium with migration be nRi ; then the total tax
revenue is nRi τ i. Thus, the waste by the government is αn
R
i τ i. Let the transfer
to each poor person be t, so that aggregate transfers are
nP ti = (1− α)nRi τ i.
We assume throughout that the tax is not confiscatory: the post-tax income of
a rich person exceeds the post-transfer income of a poor person. This requires
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that
τ i ≤
nP (yR − yP )
nP + nRi (1− α)
.
Migration The poor migrate neither into nor out of any jurisdiction. The rich
can migrate. This assumption is plausible for much of Europe, where language
barriers are more severe for people with less education. The reservation utility
to a rich person outside the jurisdiction is given by the standard of living abroad:
no rich person will live in a jurisdiction in which his utility is less.
Land Housing (or land) is owned by absentee landlords. Each person within
a jurisdiction can choose where to live; the rent at elevation e is ce.
4 Closed economy
4.1 No poor
We develop the analysis in steps. Suppose first that the economy is closed
and with no poor people. The rich then populate locations [1 − nR, 1]. In
equilibrium they all enjoy the same utility. The equilibrium rent at the lowest
occupied location, 1 − nR, is zero. (Were the rent positive, the resident would
be better oﬀ moving to the neighboring unit with zero rent.) It follows from
continuity of the utility function that lime→(1−nR) ce = 0. Thus,
Lemma 1 Rents decline smoothly towards zero when moving down: lime→(1−nR) ce =
0.
Above 1 − nR, property owners exploit the whole surplus generated by a
better location. The rent at any elevation e > 1 − nR is determined by the
condition that a rich person must enjoy the same utility at diﬀerent locations
occupied by the rich: ln(yR − τ − ce) + ln(e) = ln(yR − τ) + ln(1− nR), where
yR − τ − ce = xR. This gives
ce =
(yR − τ)(e− 1 + nR)
e
. (1)
The above relation determines the equilibrium rent for any given location, with
ce > 0 and c0e > 0. Each rich person takes the rent as given when choosing his
location and consumption. The willingness to pay for housing increases with
elevation, at the expense of foregone consumption. At the top of the hill the
rent is c1 = (yR − τ)nR. Tax capitalization is given by the condition
∂ce
∂τ
= −e− 1 + n
R
e
< 0,
and depends on two parameters, location and the size of the rich population. Tax
capitalization increases with elevation and with the size of the rich population.
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4.2 Poor present
When poor people are present, the population is nR+nP . Residences, however,
are segregated: all rich people live above all poor people. The rent paid by a
rich person in the lowest elevation occupied by the rich is determined by the
willingness to pay by the poor for locations 1 − nR − nP < e < 1 − nR. If
the poor do not pay any tax or get any transfer, the rent paid by the poor is
obtained from ln(yP − ce) + ln(e) = ln(yP ) + ln(1− nR − nP ):
ce =
yP e− yP (1− nR − nP )
e
, 1− nR − nP < e ≤ 1− nR. (2)
At the highest location occupied by a poor person, e = 1− nR, his willingness
to pay is thus
c1−nR =
yPnP
(1− nR) > 0. (3)
Hence, an increase in the number of poor people hurts each rich person, who
must pay strictly higher rents on all locations. The rent at location e above this
is determined by the indiﬀerence condition
ln(yR − τ − ce) + ln(e) = ln(yR − τ −
yPnP
(1− nR) ) + ln(1− n
R).
Hence, with poor people present
ce =
(yR − τ)(e− 1 + nR) + yPnP
e
, 1− nR < e ≤ 1. (4)
In the absence of a tax, the rent paid by a rich person is ce =
yR(e−1+nR)+yPnP
e
.
Assume next that the government transfers a fraction 1−α of the tax revenue
to the poor. Then each poor person receives
(1− α)nRτ
nP
.
Consumption by each poor person is yP + (1−α)n
Rτ
nP − ce = x
P . With such an
income transfer, the willingness to pay by the poor for location e is
ln(yP +
(1− α)nRτ
nP
− ce) + ln(e) = ln(yP +
(1− α)nRτ
nP
) + ln(1− nR − nP ).
This indiﬀerence condition for the rental market allows us to determine the
rent at the highest location occupied by the poor:
c1−nR =
yPnP + (1− α)nRτ
(1− nR) .
This must also be the rent paid by a rich person at this elevation. Income
transfers to the poor will also increase the rents paid by all the rich people above
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this location. The rent paid by a rich resident at elevation e (above where the
poor live) is4
ce =
(yR − τ)e− (yR − τ)(1− nR) + yPnP + (1− α)nRτ
e
.
Thus the rent increases with 1 − α: the greater the fraction of tax revenue
transferred to the poor, the higher the rents paid by the rich at all locations.
At the highest elevation, the rent is
c1 = (y
R − τ)nR + yPnP + (1− α)nRτ .
4.3 Some rich may consume less than some poor
Without taxes, three types of equilibria can appear:
1) Each rich person consumes more than each poor person.
2) Some rich people consume less than some poor people.
3) Each rich person consumes less than some poor people.
To establish this, note first that the utility of each rich person is the same
regardless of whether he lives at the top of the hill or at a lower location.
However, the marginal utilities from consumption and location diﬀer. At the
top, the marginal utility from consumption is large but from location is small.
Moreover, the utility of each rich person from location, ln(e), is higher than
that of any poor person. As a rich person pays a higher rent, his utility from
consumption, ln(x) can be less than that of a poor person. At the elevation
1− nR, the utility of the rich and of the poor from location are equal and they
pay an equal rent; the rich person enjoys a higher utility from consumption
than does his neighboring poor person. At higher elevations, however, rents are
higher and the utility from consumption of a rich person can be smaller than the
utility of a poor person. A condition for this can be derived by comparing the
utilities from consumption of the highest rich person and lowest poor person.
When τ = 0, the rent paid by the rich at the top is yRnR + yPnP . Then the
condition in terms of consumption is
yR − (yRnR + yPnP ) < yP .
yR(1− nR) < yP (1 + nP ).
yR < yP
1 + nP
1− nR .
As ∂(1+n
P
1−nR )/∂n
R > 0 and ∂( 1+n
P
1−nR )/∂n
P > 0, we find that when nP and nR
are large and with a given yP and yR, this inequality holds: a rich resident at
the top consumes less than a poor person at the bottom. To see why, consider an
increase in the poor population. The poor must live at the bottom, in locations
previously unoccupied. This, however, means that the rents at higher elevations
4This can be solved from the indiﬀerence condition that the utility of all the rich must be
equal, namely ln(yR − τ − ce) + ln(e) = ln(yR − τ − y
PnP+(1−α)nRτ
(1−nR) ) + ln(1− n
R).
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occupied by the poor must increase. The rich person living next to the poor
person must also pay a higher rent. But then, for equal utilities, rents paid by
the rich at higher elevations must also rise.
Consider next an increase in the rich population. Some rich people will now
live at the higher elevations that had been occupied by the poor, inducing the
poor to occupy yet lower elevations. The lowest poor person consumes as much
as before, but suﬀers from living at a lower elevation. The poor person at the
highest elevation occupied by the poor must suﬀer the same utility loss: he loses
utility from residing at a lower elevation than he had before the number of rich
people increased. This can be seen as follows. With τ = 0 the rent paid by a
rich person at elevation e is
ce =
yR(e− 1 + nR) + yPnP
e
.
At the lowest residence of a rich person, e = 1− nR, and ce = yPnP /(1− nR).
Taking the derivative, ∂(y
PnP
1−nR )/∂n
R > 0. Thus the rent paid by the lowest rich
person rises. Therefore, all the rich throughout the hill must pay a higher rent.
The greater the increase in the distance between the lowest rich person and the
highest rich person, the greater the drop in consumption of goods by the rich
at the top.
Even though a rich person may consume less goods than some poor persons,
the utility of a rich person must always exceed that of a poor person. For
otherwise
ln(yR − y
PnP
(1− nR)) + ln(1− n
R) < ln(yP ) + ln(1− nR − nP )
yR(1− nR)− yPnP < yP (1− nR − nP )
yR < yP .
This can never hold. Nevertheless, consumption of goods by the lowest rich
person may be less than that of the lowest poor person. That is, in equilibrium
it can hold that ln(yR− y
PnP
(1−nR) ) < ln(y
P ), or that yP > yR(1−nR)/(1+nP−nR),
for nP + nR >> 0). If nP > 0 this can hold even if yR > yP . Intuitively, if any
income group is large, equilibrium rents may be high, reducing consumption by
the rich.
Lemma 2 If the number of poor people is large, rents are high, reducing con-
sumption by the rich.
4.4 Optimal tax in a closed economy
4.4.1 Leviathan government
Suppose the government maximizes tax revenue, subject to the constraint that
it must return an exogenous fraction 1 − α of the tax revenue to the poor.
In a closed economy, this amounts to maximizing the tax rate subject to the
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condition that the post-tax income of an initially rich person exceeds the post-
transfer income of an initially poor person.
4.4.2 Utilitarian government
Consider next a utilitarian government which transfers all tax revenue to the
poor (α = 0), maximizing aggregate utility. If rents and residences would stay
constant, this would amount to finding the tax rate on the rich which makes
the marginal utilities across people equal. With endogenous rents, this cannot
be achieved with a uniform tax on the rich and a uniform transfer to the poor.
The reason is that the marginal utility from consumption depends on rents
paid, which diﬀer by location. Equalizing aggregate utility within each group
requires diﬀerences in utility from consumption to compensate for diﬀerences in
the utility from location. Social welfare is5
SWF =
Z 1
1−nR
[uR(yR−τ−ce(τ))+v(e)]de+
Z 1−nR
1−nR−nP
[u(yP+
nRτ
nP
−ce(τ))+v(e)]de.
We note that a person’s marginal utility from consumption and the eﬀect of a
tax on his rent and on his consumption depend on where he lives. A rich person
living at the top of the hill pays a high rent, may consume little, and so may
have a higher marginal utility of consumption than does a poor person. This
can make a negative tax with a transfer from the poor to the rich be optimal.
Consider a per capita tax τ imposed on each rich person. The optimal tax
for a utilitarian government satisfies
∂SWF
∂τ
=
Z 1
1−nR
µ
∂uR
∂xR
¶µ
∂xR
∂τ
¶
de+
Z 1−nR
1−nR−nP
µ
∂uP
∂xP
¶µ
∂xP
∂τ
¶
de = 0.
Social optimality then requires that the tax equalize the sum of the weighted
marginal utilities of consumption across income groups, ∂u
R
∂xR =
1
xR ,
∂uP
∂xP =
1
xP ,
but weighted by the relative population size and by the marginal tax eﬀects
on consumption, ∂x
R
∂τ
= −1
e
< 0, ∂x
P
∂τ
= (1−α)n
R
nP +
1−e−αnR
e
> 0. Introducing
α = 0, we obtain ∂x
P
∂τ
= n
R
nP +
1−e
e
. Inserting, the social optimum satisfies
∂SWF
∂τ
=
Z 1
1−nR
µ
∂uR
∂xR
¶µ
−1
e
¶
de+
Z 1−nR
1−nR−nP
µ
∂uP
∂xP
¶µ
nR
nP
+
1− e
e
¶
de = 0.
The optimal tax equalizes the weighted sum of the marginal utilities of con-
sumption across income groups, adjusted for the diﬀerential direct and indirect
tax eﬀects on rents and hence on consumption.
To evaluate this social optimality condition requires considering the eﬀect of
taxes and transfers on rents. Finding the optimal tax rate, however, is simplified
by recognizing the key property of the model that the rents adjust so that,
in equilibrium, all residents in the same income class have the same utility
5We assume absentee landlords whose income thus does not enter into social welfare.
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regardless of their location. It is also useful to note that the utility of each
poor person is identical to that of the poor person paying zero rent. Thus, to
determine the optimal tax rate it suﬃces to derive the eﬀect of the tax on the
resident at the lowest location in each income group. Social welfare is then the
product of the size of each income group and the utility of any member in that
group, say of the person at the lowest location. Social welfare is thus
SWF = nRUR + nPUP .
The utility of the poor person living at the lowest elevation is
UP = ln(yP +
nRτ
nP
) + ln(1− nR − nP )
= ln((yP +
nRτ
nP
)(1− nR − nP )).
The utility of the rich person living at a lower elevation than any other rich
person is
UR = ln(yR − τ − y
PnP + nRτ
(1− nR) ) + ln(1− n
R)
= ln((yR − τ)(1− nR)− yPnP − nRτ).
Thus,
SWF = nR ln((yR − τ)(1− nR)− yPnP − nRτ) + nP ln((yP + n
Rτ
nP
)(1− nR − nP ))
= nR ln(yR(1− nR)− τ − yPnP ) + nP ln((yP + n
Rτ
nP
)(1− nR − nP )).
The first-order condition for maximizing this social welfare function is6
nR
−1
yR(1− nR)− τ − yPnP + n
P
nR
nP
yP + n
Rτ
nP
= 0.
The optimal tax by a utilitarian government is therefore
τ =
1
nR/nP + 1
¡
−yP (1 + nP ) + yR
¡
−nR + 1
¢¢
. (5)
The optimal tax depends on the incomes yP and yR and on the population sizes
nP and nR.
Proposition 3 A utilitarian government may impose either a positive or a
negative tax on the rich.
6The second-order condition reveals that this gives the tax rate maximizing social welfare.
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Proof. From (5), τ ≷ 0⇐⇒ yR/yP ≷ 1+nP
1+nR .
A negative tax means that the government transfers from the poor to the
rich. The condition that the after-tax income of the rich is not smaller than the
after-transfer income of the poor translates into the condition
τ ≤ n
P (yR − yP )
nR + nP
(6)
The condition that τ in (5) fulfills (6) is satisfied. We find an even stronger
result that
Proposition 4 A utilitarian government does not fully equalize incomes.
Proof. We show that the tax rate chosen by a utilitarian government is less
than n
P (yR−yP )
nR+nP in (6). This holds when
1
nR/nP + 1
¡
−yP (1 + nP ) + yR
¡
−nR + 1
¢¢
<
nP (yR − yP )
nR + nP
.
This reduces to the condition nP yP + nRyR > 0, which always holds.
To improve understanding of utilitarian taxation, let yR = 1 and nP = 0.2.
The first normalization is without loss of generality. The second assumption
ensures a suﬃcient number of poor persons. Then the condition for a positive
τ is that
yP <
5
6
(1− nR). (7)
If this condition is not satisfied, then a utilitarian government transfers from
the poor to the rich.
Thus, a utilitarian government does not fully equalize the incomes of the
rich and the poor, and may even transfer income from the poor to the rich.
Moreover, the optimal utilitarian tax policy does not equalize the marginal
utilities of consumption across citizens. Rather, it is optimal to equalize the
marginal utility of disposable income weighted by the shares of population and
the marginal tax eﬀects on consumption.
The intuition for the result relates to the insight made by Mirrlees (1972).
He shows that when otherwise identical people live in diﬀerent locations and so
spend diﬀerent amounts on transportation, diﬀerent people will have diﬀerent
marginal utilities of income. Maximizing social welfare calls not for equalizing
incomes, but for equalizing the marginal utilities of income. In other words,
even with identical people, inequality of income distribution is part of the social
optimum. In our model, the rich may consume less than the poor, and so enjoy
a higher marginal utility of consuming goods; maximizing social welfare would
then call for transfers to the rich. A related explanation for our finding lies in
the property market. By transferring income from the poor, the government
reduces the rents that these are willing to pay. This, in turn, directly reduces
the rent paid by each rich person. Thus, by transferring income from the poor
to the rich, the government reduces rents and thus increases consumption.
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We can also consider a utilitarian government which chooses diﬀerent weights
for diﬀerent income-earners. A government with Rawlsian preferences would
maximize the welfare of the poor,
SWF = nP ln((yP +
nRτ
nP
)(1− nR − nP )).
Then, not surprisingly, ∂SWF
∂τ
> 0: unlike an equal-weighting utilitarian gov-
ernment, a Rawlsian government would equalize the after-tax income of all
residents. This naturally satisfies the constraint that the post-tax income of the
rich does not fall below that of the poor.
5 Open economy
5.1 Leviathan governments with migration
We now turn our attention to migration between countries. Assume two coun-
tries, a and b, with nR rich people initially living in each country. The rich can
migrate at zero cost, exhibit no home country preference. Each jurisdiction has
nP ≥ 0 poor residents, who do not migrate. Each resident pays taxes in the
country in which he lives. Then a domestic tax on the rich creates an incentive
to emigrate abroad. We thus make the lowest locations occupied in each country
endogenous. To ensure suﬃcient space in each jurisdiction for immobile domes-
tic poor and mobile rich from both jurisdictions, we assume that nP +2nR ≤ 1.
As we are concerned with tax competition, in our time line governments simul-
taneously choose their tax rates; people observe the tax rates when deciding to
migrate.
The government redistributes a fraction 1 − α of tax revenue to the poor.
This generates a feed-back between taxation and migration of the rich. The
larger the transfer to the poor, the higher the poor bid rents. This in turn
makes the jurisdiction less desirable to the rich. Thus, we expect more people
to migrate in response to any given tax diﬀerence the greater the fraction of tax
revenue the government transfers to the poor. But counteracting this, migration
of the rich reduces transfers to the poor, thus reducing their willingness to pay
for good locations. This in turn limits migration in response to a given tax
diﬀerence.
The migration equilibrium for any given tax is determined by a simultaneous
system of six equations. These represent per capita transfers to the poor and
the rents paid by the rich at the lowest elevation that they occupy in the two
countries, population identity, and the arbitrage condition that the utility of
the rich is the same in the two jurisdictions.
The per-capita transfer to the poor in country i, i ∈ {a, b}, is
ti =
(1− α)nRi τ i
nP
. (8)
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The arbitrage condition in the rental market gives the rent paid by the poor
in country i in the highest location that they occupy
ln(yP +
(1− α)nRi τ i
nP
− c1−nRi ) + ln(1− n
R
i ) (9)
= ln(yP +
(1− α)nRi τ i
nP
) + ln(1− nRi − nP ).
This condition states that the utility of the poor living at the highest location
occupied by the poor equals the utility of the poor living at the lowest occupied
location (where the rent is zero). Equation (9) yields
c1−nRi =
yPnP + (1− α)nRi τ i
(1− nRi )
. (10)
Population identity states that the sum of post-migration rich populations
equals the sum of initial rich populations:
nRa + n
R
b = 2n
R. (11)
The arbitrage condition imposed by migration by the rich across the two
jurisdictions states
ln(yR − τa − c1−nRa ) + ln(1− n
R
a ) = ln(y
R − τ b − c1−nRb ) + ln(1− n
R
b ). (12)
The arbitrage conditions in the rental market state that the utility of a rich
person is the same at all locations occupied by the rich, so it suﬃces to present
migration equilibrium as equating utilities of arbitrarily chosen rich individuals
in the two countries. We choose those rich people living at the lowest elevation
occupied by rich people in each country. As utility functions are continuous,
rents are also continuous with elevation. Thus, the rent paid by the rich at
the border between the rich and the poor equals the rent that would be paid
by a poor person at the same location. Substituting c1−nRa and c1−nRb from
(10) and inserting (11), we can solve from the migration arbitrage condition the
post-migration rich population in country a:
nRa =
(yR − τa)− (yR − τ b)(1− 2nR) + (1− α)2nRτ b
2yR − ατa − ατ b
. (13)
Similarly, in the post-migration equilibrium the number of rich persons living
in country b is
nRb =
(yR − τ b)− (yR − τa)(1− 2nR) + (1− α)2nRτa
2yR − ατa − ατ b
. (14)
Note that (13) and (14) are independent of the number of poor persons.
Though migration depends on the share of tax revenue transferred to the poor,
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it does not depend on how many poor receive the transfer.7If there are no poor
people, then α must equal 1. Equations (13) and (14) then simplify to
nRa (n
P = 0) =
(yR − τa)− (yR − τ b)(1− 2nR)
2yR − τa − τ b
(15)
and
nRb (n
P = 0) =
(yR − τ b)− (yR − τa)(1− 2nR)
2yR − τa − τ b
. (16)
5.1.1 Nash equilibria with tax competition
A government which aims to maximize its tax revenue in a closed economy
raises the tax rate to equalize the after-tax income of the rich and the poor.
In an open economy, the ability of the rich to emigrate imposes an additional
constraint. Therefore, even a revenue maximizing government may choose a tax
rate that does not equalize incomes: potential migration by the rich disciplines
government, as suggested by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). With endogenous
property values, this intuition needs to be re-examined. This is our agenda here.
Assume that each government maximizes its tax revenue, subject to the
constraint that the post-tax income of a rich person exceeds the post-transfer
income of a poor person, and that a fraction 1−α of tax revenue is transferred
to the poor. If there are no poor, then α = 1; α = 1 may hold also in the
presence of the poor. By (13), tax revenue in jurisdiction a is
ta = τa
(yR − τa)− (yR − τ b)(1− 2nR) + (1− α)2nRτ b
2yR − ατa − ατ b
.
Maximizing with respect to the tax rate, τa, yields the first-order condition
(−2τa+τ b+2nRyR−α2nRτ b)(2yR−ατa−ατ b)+ατa(−τa+τ b+2nRyR−α2nRτ b) = 0.
By the negativity of the second-order condition, the first-order condition yields
tax rates maximizing tax revenue. In a symmetric equilibrium, τa = τ b = τN .
The first-order condition therefore simplifies to
(−τN + 2nRyR − α2nRτN )(2yR − 2ατN ) + ατN (2nRyR − α2nRτN ) = 0.
This leads to a second-order algebraic equation in the tax rate. The only solution
satisfying the restrictions yR > 0, nR > 0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is
τN =
2nRyR
nRα+ 1
. (17)
We see that an increase in the share of tax revenue government retains reduces
the tax in both countries. For intuition, recall that each government aims to
maximize the product of ατ i and nRi , i ∈ {a, b}. For any given tax rate assumed
7Note, however, the requirement that the rich cannot be made poorer than the poor.
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to be chosen by the other government, a decrease in the country’s tax rate
increases the tax base by encouraging immigration, but reduces the tax revenue
collected from the initial tax base. Each government balances these eﬀects. An
increase in α increases the value of each tax payer with any given tax rate,
thus intensifying incentives to compete for taxpayers. Each government then
gains from reducing the tax on the rich. A country which imposed a high tax
would lose tax base to the other country which imposes a lower tax. The Nash
equilibrium in tax rates thus requires lower tax rates in both countries. To
summarize,
Proposition 5 Assuming that the Leviathan government is not constrained by
(6), the optimal tax on the rich increases with the share of tax revenue trans-
ferred to the poor.
Proof. The result follows from ∂τN/∂α < 0.
It remains to verify that the tax rate is not so high that it would make the
after-tax income of the rich be less than that of the poor. This requires that
α ≥ 2n
RyR(nP + nR)− nP (yR − yP )
nRnP (yR − yP ) + nR2nRyR .
Were α low, the government would transfer much of its tax revenue to the
poor in each country. The required condition may then be violated. On the
other hand, high α helps satisfy this condition for the further reason that it
encourages the governments to only lightly tax the rich.
If the governments transfer all revenue, α = 0, the tax rate is τ = min(2nRyR, n
P (yR−yP )
nP+nR )
where 2nRyR is from (17) and n
P (yR−yP )
nP+nR is the tax rate when incomes of the
rich and the poor are fully equalized after taxes and transfers.8
The findings suggest that when each government aims to maximize its rev-
enues, international tax competition does not lead to a race to the bottom. This
can be verified from (17) with strictly positive tax rate τN = 2n
RyR
nRα+1 > 0 for
all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This result arises from the rental markets when good locations
are scarce, so that the tax is capitalized in rents. The fall in rents ensures that
diﬀerences in taxes do not lead to corner solutions with all the rich moving to
the country with a lower tax. In the absence of a rental market and of land
scarcity, tax competition would lead to zero tax rates. But in our model the
equilibrium tax is positive.
We summarize with
Proposition 6 Even when the rich are mobile, taxes do not show a race to the
bottom. Capitalization of taxes in rents which makes landlords bear some of the
tax burden, and migration which raises rents in the destination country, reduce
the incentives to migrate. With identical jurisdictions, the equilibrium has no
migration. The equilibrium tax on the rich is either equal to or lower than it
would be in a closed economy.
8For (6) not to bind, we must have 2nRyR ≤ n
P (yR−yP )
nP+nR .
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For numerical illustration, let yR = 1 and nP = 0.2. This limits the number
of the rich to 0 < nR ≤ 0.4, thus allowing us to analyze the cases where the
relative number of the rich varies from arbitrarily low values to twice the number
of the poor. The tax is then
τ =
2nR, if yP ≤ 1− 2nR − 10(nR)2
1−yP
1+5nR , if y
P > 1− 2nR − 10(nR)2 (18)
If instead each government retains all the tax revenue, the tax rate is τ =
min( 2n
RyR
nR+1 , y
R − yP ). For our numerical values,
τ =
2nR
1+nR , if y
P ≤ 1−nR
1+nR
1− yP , if yP > 1−nR1+nR
. (19)
Therefore, if the income of the poor is suﬃciently low, a Leviathan govern-
ment chooses a higher tax when it redistributes to the poor; if the income of
the poor is suﬃciently high, it chooses a higher tax when it retains all the tax
revenue. We summarize these results as
Proposition 7 If the income of the poor is suﬃciently low, then tax competition
between Leviathan governments leads to a higher tax rate if the governments
distribute their tax revenue to the poor. If the income of the poor is suﬃciently
high, then tax competition between Leviathan governments leads to a higher tax
rate if the governments do not distribute their tax revenue to the poor.
We notice that the tax equilibrium may diﬀer if the government in either ju-
risdiction has other objectives. For example, the government in one jurisdiction
may maximize tax revenue, while the other has a Rawlsian welfare function.
5.2 Utilitarian governments with migration
Assume instead that each government maximizes the utility of citizens initially
living in the country.9 Our qualitative results do not depend on the particular
functional form of the utility function assumed below, but hold for any linear
transformation of it.
In choosing the tax, a government must take into account the public budget
constraint, the eﬀects of a tax on rents, and migration responses that equalize
the utility of the rich between the two jurisdictions. This suggests that migration
increases the cost of increasing the utility of the rich. On the other hand, a heavy
tax on the rich not only reduces their utility, but also causes them to emigrate,
thus reducing tax revenue from them. As the emigration of the rich also aﬀects
rents paid by the poor and locations where they live, the eﬀects of the mobility
of the rich on optimal utilitarian tax policy are a priori ambiguous.
9This assumption is needed because if the government would maximize the sum of the
utilities of citizens living in the country after migration, and if the utility functions would
have negative values, then each government would want a zero population.
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To find an optimal tax by the government, we must first solve the migration
responses by the rich and the equilibrium in the rental market. These are derived
in the previous section. The social welfare function for country a is
SWF = nP ln(yP+ta)+n
P ln(1−nP−nRa )+nR ln(yR−τa−c1−nRa )+n
R ln(1−nRa ).
Inserting (8), (10) and (13) results in
SWF = nP ln(2yRnP yP − τ2a + τaτ b + 2τanRyR) + nP ln(2yR + τa − τ b − 2nRyR − 2yRnP )
+nR ln(yR(2yR − τa − τ b − 2nRyR)− 2yRyPnP )
−nP ln(2yRnP )− nP ln(2yR)− nR ln(2yR).
Diﬀerentiating with respect to τa yields
∂SWF
∂τa
=
nP (−2τa + τ b + 2nRyR)
2yRnP yP − τ2a + τaτ b + 2τanRyR
+
nP
2yR + τa − τ b − 2nRyR − 2yRnP
+
−nR
2yR − τa − τ b − 2nRyR − 2yPnP
.
The analysis of Nash equilibria must distinguish between solutions in which
the condition that the tax cannot make the after-tax income of the rich less than
the after-transfer income of the poor does or does not bind. This condition is
given by τ ≤ n
P (yR−yP )
nR+nP . When this condition does not bind, we can simplify
by using the symmetry property that τa = τ b = τ :
nP (−τ + 2nRyR)
2yRnP yP + 2τnRyR
+
nP
2yR − 2nRyR − 2yRnP (20)
+
−nRyR
(yR(2yR − 2τ − 2nRyR)− 2yRyPnP ) = 0.
Numerical analysis gives our main result:
Proposition 8 Utilitarian governments may choose either lower or higher taxes
on the rich when migration is possible than when it is not.
Proof. We prove existence with numerical examples exhibiting the claimed
qualitative results. If nP = nR = yP = 0.1 and yR = 1, the optimal tax in a
closed economy (with migration not possible) is 0.395; the optimal tax under
tax competition (with migration possible) is 0.195. If nP = nR = 0.1, yP = 0.5
and yR = 1, the optimal tax in a closed economy is 0.175, and the optimal tax
under tax competition is 0.183.
It is no surprise that migration (or tax competition) can lead to lower taxes:
the ability of the rich to migrate imposes an additional constraint on the govern-
ment’s ability to tax them. But the opposite result appears novel and surprising.
The reason tax competition can increase tax rates is because of the eﬀects that
appear in the rental market for land. Emigration by rich taxpayers reduces com-
petition for desirable locations and so reduces rents. The reduced rents benefit
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the poor, either because they pay lower rents, or because they live in better loca-
tions. The immigration of the rich, on the other hand, generates two eﬀects for
the receiving country. Rich migrants generate more tax revenue. But they also
bid up rents. When the rent eﬀect dominates, a utilitarian government would
prefer to induce part of the domestic rich to migrate to the other country. As
symmetric countries in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium choose identical tax rates,
there is no migration in equilibrium. A government, however, may impose a
higher tax than in a closed economy. Thus, the ability of the rich to avoid taxes
by migrating hurts them by inducing both countries to impose higher taxes.
6 Conclusion
The urban economics view of taxation and migration complements the stan-
dard public finance view of taxation with mobility. The fall in property values
reduces the incentive of the rich to migrate, thereby allowing for more redis-
tributive taxation than is predicted by standard models in public finance. Our
paper established two conditions that together create scope for income redis-
tribution from the rich to the poor even in the absence of mobility costs or
complementarities between the rich and the poor: (i) the scarcity of desirable
locations and (ii) lower willingness to pay by the poor for favorable locations.
If either condition fails the scope for redistribution is limited.
We found that when rents are endogenous, a utilitarian government in a
closed economy may redistribute from the poor to the rich. The intuition for
this was that by taxing the poor, the government reduces rents that both the
poor and the rich pay. The resultant utility gains may exceed the decline in
consumption by the poor. Related to this, we also find that some or, in some
cases, even all the rich may consume less non-housing goods than do the poor.
The marginal utility of consumption for a rich person may exceed the marginal
utility of consumption for a poor person, further justifying transfers to the rich.
When the rich can migrate, and government disregards the welfare of land-
lords, a utilitarian government may impose a higher tax than when the rich
cannot migrate. The result can arise because a tax which induces emigration by
the rich reduces demand for desirable locations, allowing the poor to pay lower
rents or to enjoy better locations. The increased number of rich people in the
other country can also generate an externality, reducing the welfare of the poor
in that country. Tax competition can then lead both countries to tax the rich
more heavily than they otherwise would. Though such a strong result does not
always apply, it suggests that accounting for responses in the housing market
can overturn common views on the eﬀects of migration on income redistribution.
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